Posts Tagged ‘Portugal’

George Soros on European Fiscal & Banking Crisis and EU Summit on June 28-29, 2012

Monday, June 25th, 2012

Here I present key take-aways from George Soros’ in depth Bloomberg interview on the current European fiscal and banking crisis, Angela Merkel, the Spanish bailout, and Greece leaving the Eurozone.

The video is also below:

Banking & Fiscal Issues

  • “There is an interrelated problem of the banking system and the excessive risk premium on sovereign debt – they are Siamese twins, tied together and you have to tackle both.”
  • Soros summarizes the forthcoming Eurozone Summit ‘fiasco’ as fatal if the fiscal disagreements are not resolved in 3 days.
  • There is no union without a transfer.
  • Europe needs banking union.
    • Germany will only succumb if Italy and Spain really push it to the edge (Germany can live in the present situation; the others cannot)
    • Europe needs a fiscal means of strengthening growth through Treasury type entity
      • What is needed is a European fiscal authority that will be composed of the finance ministers, but would be in charge of the various rescue mechanisms, the European Stability Mechanism, and would combine issuing treasury bills.
        • Those treasury bills would yield 1% or less and that would be the relief that those countries need in order to finance their debt.
        • Bill would be sold on a competitive basis.
        • Right now there are something like over €700bn euros are kept on deposit at the European Central Bank earning a 0.25% because the interbank market has broken down, so then you have €700bn of capital that would be very happy to earn 0.75% instead of 0.25%, and the treasury bills by being truly riskless and guaranteed by the entire community, would yield in current conditions less than 1%.
        • Governments should start a European unemployment scheme, paid on a European level instead of national level.
        • Soros’ solutions, however, are unlikely to prove tenable in the short-term as he notes “Merkel has emerged as a strong leader”, but “unfortunately, she has been leading Europe in the wrong direction”.
          • “Euro bonds are not possible because Germany would not consider euro bonds until there is a political union, and it should come at the end of the process not at the beginning.
          • This would be a temporary measure, limited both in time and in size, and thereby it could be authorized according to the German constitution as long as the Bundestag approves it, so it could be legal under the German constitution and under the existing treaties.
          • The political will by Germany to put it into effect and that would create a level playing field so that Italy and Spain could actually refinance debt on reasonable terms.

Scenario Discussion

  • LTRO would be less effective now
  • At 6%, 7% of Italy’s GDP goes towards paying interest, which is completely unsustainable
  • Spain may need a full bailout if summit is not successful
    • Financial markets have the ability to push countries into default
    • Because Spain cannot print money itself
    • Even if we manage to avoid, let’s say an ‘accident’ similar to what you had in 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the euro system that would emerge would actually perpetuate the divergence between creditors and debtors and would create a Europe which is very different from open society.
    • It would transform it into a hierarchical system where the division between creditors and debtors would become permanent…It would lead to Germany being in permanent domination.
      • It would become like a German empire, and the periphery would become permanently depressed areas.

On Greece

  • Greece will leave the Eurozone
    • It’s very hard to see how Greece can actually meet the conditions that have been set for Greece, and the Germans are determined not to modify those conditions seriously, so medium term risk
    • Greece leaving the euro zone is now a real expectation, and this is what is necessary to strengthen the rest of the euro zone, since Greece can’t print money
    • By printing money, a country can devalue the currency and people can lose money by buying devalued debt, but there is no danger of default.
      • The fact that the individual members don’t now control the right to print money has created this situation.
      • A European country that could actually default. and that is the risk that the financial markets price into the market and that is why say Italian ten-year bonds yield 6% whereas British 10-year bonds yield only 1.25%.
  • That difference is due to the fact that these countries have surrendered their right to print their own money and they can be pushed into default by speculation in the financial markets.

On Angela Merkel

  • Angela Merkel has been leading Europe in the wrong direction. I think she is acting in good faith and that is what makes the whole situation so tragic and that is a big problem that we have in financial markets generally – she is supporting a false idea, a false ideology, a false interpretation which is reinforced by reality.
  • In other words, Merkel’s method works for a while until it stops working, and that is what is called a financial bubble
    • Financial bubbles look very good while they are being formed and everyone believes in it and then it turns out to be unsustainable…
    • The European Union could turn out to have been a bubble of this kind unless we realize there is this problem and we solve it and the solution is there.
    • I think everybody can see it, all we need to do is act on it, and put on a united front, and I think that if the rest of  Europe is united, I think that Germany will actually recognize it and adjust to it.

On Investing

  • Stay in cash
  • German yields are too low
  • If summit turns out well, purchase industrial shares, but avoid everything else (consumer, banks)

Conclusion: We are facing conditions reminiscent to the 1930s because of policy mistakes, forgetting what we should have learned from John Maynard Keynes.

Bank of Spain Nationalizes Bankia – Property Bubble Bursting

Wednesday, May 9th, 2012

According to ZeroHedge, the Bank of Spain has recently nationalized Bankia, the first of many nationalizations that have to occur in Spain because of poor underwriting by the cajas (regional banks/savings and loan institutions) and falling real estate prices. The Spanish housing price graph above shows how much further the property bubble went in Spain, where at one point, more than 15% of the labor force was working in construction.

With a government debt to GDP ratio of 70%, and another 30%+ of municipal debt, where is Spain getting the money to accomplish these bailouts?

By Alexander Lemming, Leverage Academy Associate

Statement on BFA-Bankia

The Board of Finance and Savings Bank (BFA) announced today the Bank of Spain its decision not to buy in the terms and conditions agreed to the securities issued in the amount of € 4.465m who signed the FROB (Bank Restructuring Fund). BFA has concluded that the most desirable to strengthen the soundness of the business project that began with the appointment of Jose Ignacio Goirigolzarri as president is to request the conversion of these titles in stock ordinary. This conversion must be authorized by the Bank of Spain and the other authorities Spanish authorities and community and will be conducted in accordance with the valuation process established in the indenture securities.

The Bank of Spain has worked hard in recent months with the group address BFA-Bankia to specify the measures to ensure compliance with the provisions of the RD-l 2/2012 for the sanitation Spanish financial system. BFA-Bankia late March presented a restructuring plan and restructuring that included measures that would comply with the RD-l, and standardize its financial  position.

After analyzing this reorganization plan, the Bank of Spain also ordered the entity measures complementary to streamline and strengthen management structures and management, increasing professionalization and a divestment program. These additional actions should serve to enhance the soundness of the institution and restore market confidence. The events of the past weeks and the growing uncertainty about the future of the company has made it advisable to go further and raise the providing resources to accelerate and increase public sanitation.

The changes in the presidency of BFA-Bankia is precisely oriented in the direction shown in professional management and allow the group to boost its restructuring program. The new address of the entity must submit in the shortest possible plan of reorganization strengthened that places BFA-Bankia able to cope with a full guarantee its future.

In any case, BFA-Bankia is a solvent entity that continues to function quite normally and customers and depositors should have no concern. (ZHedge)

Italian 10 year Yield Rises Above 7.4%, Country Theoretically Unable to Fund Itself at These Levels (Bankrupt), Prime Minister Offers to Resign

Wednesday, November 9th, 2011

November 9, 2011: After Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi offered to resign yesterday, the credit markets almost sighed in relief. But today, markets were punched in the jugular as LCH.Clearnet increased margin requirements on Italian bonds. Margins were raised because 10 year credit spread exceeded 450 bps, the same point at which Clearnet raised margins on the bonds of other peripheral countries in Europe.
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The pressure is certainly on the ECB and Italy now to find a solution to this debt crisis, as Italy is too large to be bailout out. Yesterday, known for his sex scandals and political corruption, Prime Minister Berlusconi was pressured to leave his post because Italian yields were creeping above 6.5%. According to the Times, “In the end, it was not the sex scandals, the corruption trials against him or even a loss of popular consensus that appeared to end Mr. Berlusconi’s 17 years as a dominant figure in Italian political life. It was, instead, the pressure of the markets — which drove Italy’s borrowing costs to record highs — and the European Union, which could not risk his dragging down the euro and with it the world economy. On Wednesday, yields on 10-year Italian government bonds — the price demanded by investors to loan Italy money — edged above 7 percent, the highest level since the adoption of the euro 10 years ago and close to levels that have required other euro zone countries to seek bailouts.”
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Currently, the Italian 10 year yield has exceeded 7.4%, and the 2 year note has risen more than 10 year rate. At this point, Italy is theoretically unable to fund itself and could theoretically be bankrupt. The margin call on bonds due between seven and 10 years was raised by five percentage points to 11.65%, for bonds due between 10 years and 15 years it was raised by five percentage points to 11.80%, while for bonds that mature in 15 years and 30 years the margin call was raised by five percentage points to 20%. The changes come into effect Nov. 9 and will have an impact on margin calls from Nov. 10, the French arm of LCH.Clearnet said.

Soros Says the U.S. is Already in a Double Dip Recession – Defining Balance Sheet Recessions

Sunday, September 25th, 2011

Soros recently asserted that Europe could be more dangerous to the global financial markets than the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008, because of the political stubbornness of European policy makers.   He has been saying this for over two years now, while government officials continue to ignore him, focusing instead on making bold statements and causing riots.  In a brilliant move, Soros returned investor capital at the end of July to avoid the eyes of the public.  I am sure he is now short sovereigns via CDS, currencies, and synthetic instruments, while he continues to donate to the poor in Eastern Europe like a modern day Robin Hood.  Since March, Italian CDS has more than doubled, and French and Belgian CDS spreads will continue to creep higher as the sovereign crisis persists.  How are Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal supposed to grow their way out of debt, as deficit cutting reduces European GDP growth to less than 1%?

The public doesn’t trust officials to make timely decisions to protect the EU.   The PIIGS (Ireland and Italy included) pose an insurmountable task for the region, as the combined nations have far greater GDP and net leverage than Germany, the only country that will be supporting the EFSF with a AAA rating. Italy itself has €1.2 trillion of debt, which is  more than Germany, and France may be downgraded in the next 6 months, which is evident in how much its CDS spread has widened over the past 2 months.  France also cannot print money like the United States, and certainly should have been downgraded beforehand, sharply decreasing the effectiveness of the stabilization facility in the EU. A French downgrade would not only endanger French banks, it would create counterparty risk for its U.S. partners as well.  Soros has already claimed that the U.S. is currently in a double dip recession, which I personally think to be true.

Both the majority of the EU and the United States are in a global double dip already not only because of policy mistakes, but due to unsustainable leverage, overspending, broken healthcare and education systems, and corrupt governments. Recent real estate, manufacturing, and confidence numbers, along with revisions down in the earnings of major metallurgical coal and transportation companies in developed countries support my thesis (look at tickers ANR, WLT).  Alpha Natural Resources recently cited a sharp decrease in coal demand for steel production in Asia, reflecting weakness in both its U.S. and ex-U.S. clients.  In the U.S., real estate usually contributes 15% to GDP growth, and it is showing no chance of recovering (HOV), as most sales over the past two years have been distressed sales driven by investors, not families or single buyers.  Developed economies are slowing down quickly, as elected officials argue over who is more important than the other.  The S&P 500 ex-dividends is at the same level it was in 1998, the FTSE MIB in Italy is down 30% on the year (40% from April), and the emerging market index (EEM) just broke its 2010 lows.  Many European financial institution equities are down 60%+ to date.  Markets are broken, as the CME has to raise margins every other day to bring down the prices of precious metals, which are rising in the face of fiat destruction and future inflation risk.  Poverty has reached 15% in the United States, unemployment is over 9.2%, underemployment is about 17%, and local government cuts have resulted in the layoffs of countless public employees, like the recent 3,000 teachers who were fired in Providence, Rhode Island.

There are 44 million people on food stamps in the United States, which is supposed to be the wealthiest nation, and the land of hope for many immigrants.  Over 30% of the U.S. population pays more than half their gross income on rent, since incomes (adjusting for inflation) have not increased since 2000.  With rents projected to increase 3-4% in metropolitan areas over the next year, even the educated poor may be driven out of cities or on to the streets. The land of hope? Why don’t you ask my hardworking university friends about hope, who are much more qualified than some of their U.S. peers, but cannot get jobs and improve the quality of our economy due to the difficulty of obtaining visas.  This country was built by immigrants, who are now blocked out of entering the nation. Teen unemployment also hit decade lows this past month.

According to New York-based Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), which tracks some 20 large economies contributing about 80% of the world GDP and provides critical information about upturns and downturns of economic cycles to money managers, we will know within the next 60 days whether we are in a recession or not.  ECRI’s Lakshman Achuthan has been one of the most accurate forecasters for economic cycles over the past decade.   He argues that the 2008/2009 recession was different than the sharp recession of the 1980s, “This is very different than the early 1980s. The issues that ail the U.S. economy and the jobs market today are not things that result from nearby events. What we’re living through and dealing with now has been building for decades,” he says. “If you look at the data, you see that the pace of expansion has been stair-stepping down ever since the 1970s, on all counts — on production, how much can we produce, how many jobs can we create, how much money do we make, how much do we sell. These are all trending down.” In the deep recession of the 1980s, GDP growth was 5%+ coming out of it…our growth in Q111 was revised down to 0.4%, and will be less than 2% for the year. Don’t believe me? Check on your own.

“If we do have a double-dip recession, Achuthan says, the people who are already having trouble finding work and paying bills are already in a depression and that they “are going to suffer more.”  ”It poses massive problems for policymakers because a new recession automatically increases all of these expenditures out of the public sector, while at the same time dramatically decreasing all their revenue,” he says. “So there’s even less ability to help the people who are hurting the most.”

Although I am not a fan of Roubini for his sensationalist gloom and doom scenarios, he does do decent research and predicted a 60% chance of a double dip in the U.S. three weeks ago.  The United States is in a balance sheet recession, as the economist Richard Koo, a strategist at Nomura, predicted may happen back in 2009.   Most of the growth we have experienced has been the result of continued fiscal and monetary stimulus from the United States government over the past three years, as well as inventory restocking.  The biggest driver of this slow and painful recession is that more stringent underwriting standards for real estate lending and small business lending are slowing down aggregate demand and GDP growth.  Koo argues that once you have a balance sheet recession, people focus on paying down debt, making the situation much worse over time.   The government has to increase fiscal stimulus for the entire duration of the private credit contraction cycle to overcome private deleveraging.  Unfortunately war and internal conflict has made this impossible in the United States as our debt to GDP nears 100%. Since the private sector has moved away from profit maximization to debt minimization, newly generated savings and debt repayments enter the banking system but cannot leave the system due to a lack of borrowers.  The economy here will not and cannot enter self-sustaining growth until private sector balance sheets are repaired.

If the government tries to cut spending too aggressively in 2012-2013, Koo thinks that we would fall into the same trap President FDR fell into in 1937 and that Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto fell into in 1997.  The deflationary gap created by a lack of credit creation and fiscal stimulus “will continue to push the economy toward a contractionary equilibrium until the private sector is too impoverished to save any money.”  The economy will collapse again, and the second collapse will be worse than the first.  It will be difficult to convince people to change their behavior in this scenario.

In a typical recession, private sector balance sheets are not hurt very badly, and most still express profit maximizing behavior.  People borrow money and spend as interest rates are lowered.  In a balance sheet recession, consumers refuse to borrow even if rates are at 0%.  This results in asset prices collapsing and banking crises.  Banks then cannot lend into the private sector, and the government becomes the borrower of last resort, at extremely low rates, because banks don’t need to hold capital against government loans.  When people use money to pay down debt, they withdraw money from their bank accounts and pay it back to the banks, so both deposits and the money supply shrink, which actually caused the Great Depression.  For example, 88% of Obama’s tax rebates have been used to pay down debt.

Let me put it in perspective:

According to Koo, “The Board of Governors of the Fed in 1976 estimated that deposits lost in Depression-era bank closures and through increased hoarding of cash outside of the banking system explained just 15% of the almost $18 billion decline in deposits during the period. Meanwhile, bank lending to the private sector plunged 47%, or by almost $20 billion, from 1929 to 1932. The conventional wisdom is that lending fell because banks panicked in response to dwindling reserves and forcibly called in loans. But that same Fed study shows that bank reserves did not actually fall during that period, when borrowings from the Fed are taken into account. In addition, a survey of almost 3,500 manufacturers, undertaken in 1932 by the National Industrial Conference Board, showed that fewer than 15% of the firms surveyed reported any difficulty in their dealings with banks.”
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If bank closures, cash hoarding and heartless bankers didn’t cause the Depression, what did? ”There’s only one possible alternative explanation for that era’s dramatic shrinkage in deposits and loans — or, at least, for the 85% of those shrinkages that can’t be attributed to the traditional villains. And that is that firms were reducing their debt voluntarily. At that time, the Fed tried to increase money supply by pumping reserves into the system, but with everyone paying down debt, the multiplier was actually negative, so it produced no results whatsoever.”
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And companies became hellbent to pay down debt because — “The price of assets purchased with borrowed funds (as most had been, during the Roaring’20s) collapsed after the stock market crash, and companies’ leverage had already gotten extremely high before the Crash. In other words, companies in the 1930s faced the same balance sheet problems as Japanese firms confronted in the 1990s. The lesson we learned from our experience in Japan is that with the government borrowing and spending money, the money multiplier will stay positive, and that’s basically how Japan kept its GDP growing throughout its Great Recession. So we have a situation where fiscal policy is actually controlling the effectiveness of monetary policy. It’s a complete reversal of what almost everyone alive today learned in school — that monetary policy is the way to go. But once everyone is minimizing debt instead of maximizing profits, all sorts of fundamental assumptions go out the window.” Just like a severe asset price crash on leverage caused crises for the U.S. in the 1930s and for Japan in the 1990s, our real estate driven recession is more than just a manufacturing slowdown or a simple policy mistake.
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In the U.S. we had over 150 bank closures last year, and have had 72 in 2011.  Banks are reticent to lend, but the real problem continues to be that there is less demand for money, and deleveraging will continue to weigh on growth for years. There are many parallels Koo describes with the Japanese crisis as well, which I will discuss in another article.
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The worst part of our current situation in the U.S. is that new bank capital adequacy standards are making it even more difficult for banks to encourage private lending.  So banks do not wish to lend, lending standards have increased dramatically, and citizens don’t want to borrow…and now with a flat yield curve, I don’t understand how financial institutions are going to dig their way out of this mess with profits either. Thank you Ben Bernanke.  Your “operation twist” policy has eroded all profit potential for financial institutions in 2012.  Let the deleveraging continue…

Cheers, Singh

“As I said there is nothing wrong with failing. Pick yourself up and try it again. You never are going to know how good you really are until you go out and face failure.”
-Henry Kravis

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Goldman on the Irish Bailout…European Contagion

Monday, November 22nd, 2010


The Irish bailout being unveiled this week will determine the performance of both the Euro and the global equity markets.  Irish and Portuguese bond spreads had been widening over the past four weeks, since Ireland again became the focus of bearish investors.  Sources claim that the current bailout will be less than 100 billion euros, and will cover the entire country’s budget needs for the next three years.  Ireland’s current budget deficit is about 19 billion euros/year. The problem is that the Irish banking system may need more help than analysts expect.  The system has more than half a trillion in assets.  According to Reuters, the hole in the commercial real estate sector is greater than 25 billion Euros alone.  This does not include potential residential losses.

To make matters worse, a Irish debt resolution could also simply shift bearish speculation to Portugal according to Citigroup and Nomura.  According to Bloomberg, “Portugal’s bonds currently yield 6.88%, compared to 8.26% for Ireland and 11.62 % for Greece.” Growth in Portugal may slow to 0.2% in 2011, which could make the deficit worse and increase worries about the country’s sovereign debt.

Zero Hedge recently provided Goldman’s perspective on the Irish bailout: “For what it’s worth, here is Goldman’s take on the Irish bailout. Since it was Goldman’s endless currency swaps that allowed Europe to lie about their deficits and true debt levels, this should be interesting…

From Francesco Garzarelli

Earlier tonight, Ireland applied for conditional funding assistance and will therefore be the first Eurozone sovereign accessing the EU-IMF support framework instituted in May. The latest European Economics Analyst provides background. There are still several uncertainties surrounding the deal, including the government’s political support (a by-election is due this Thursday), and negotiations on the banks. The yield spread between 5-yr Irish government bonds and their German counterparts has fallen by around 100bp from the 600bp highs reached on 11 November. At this point, we see scope only for a further 50bp tightening. That said, we think that this represents an important step towards a resolution of EMU sovereign woes, and a gradual relaxation of the risk premium that has built up in Italy and Spain, and in Eastern Europe.

Main Points

According to EU sources quoted by the newswires, the size of the package will be in the region of EUR 80-90bn. But this has still to be finalized, including the implications, if any for the Irish banks’ debt.  The amount is broadly in line with our estimates, and can easily be covered. Consider that the EFSM is endowed with EUR 60bn and EFSF has borrowing capacity of EUR 428bn (the portion guaranteed by Germany and France amounts to EUR 220bn). Additional IMF funding is available for up to 50% of the total amount drawn from the EFSM/EFSF with a ceiling of EUR 250bn. Both the UK and Sweden have announced they stand ready to provide bi-lateral loans.
Discussions on the cost of funds are also underway. We expect the EFSF (AAA-rated) to borrow in the region of 2.5% at the 5-yr maturity.  Assuming the terms are in line to those applied to Greece (which should represent a ceiling, given the different credit position of the two countries), the funding cost to Ireland would be along these lines:

  • EFSM/EFSF: Up to 3-yr maturity, Euribor or fixed swap + 300bp; Above 3-yr, Euribor or fixed swap +400bp; 50bp handling fee; (3-mth Euribor is currently 97bp)
  • IMF: Up to 3-yr maturity, SDR rate + 200bp; Above 3-yr, SDR rate + 300bp; Commitment fee, 50bp (est.) + 50bp service charge; (the Euro SDR rate is linked to 3-mth Euripo and is currently around 26bp)
    Using these figures and under a no IMF funding hypothesis, the savings for Ireland relative to the secondary market rates as of last Friday’s close would be in the region of 100bp (notice that the ECB has been intervening in this market, and that this is not indicative of primary access costs).
  • Ireland April 2013 yields 6.30% (bid); corresponding Eurozone funding 2.00%+300bp=5.00%
  • Ireland April 2016 yields 7.40% (mid), corresponding Eurozone funding  2.40%+400bp=6.40%

These, we stress, should be taken as ceilings. A ballpark of 60-30 from the EFSM/EFSF and IMF would result in funding cost closer to 3.5% on a 3-yr horizon.

Broader Market Implications

As discussed in our notes over the past fortnight, and in our latest Fixed Income Monthly, EMU Spreads: Navigating the Issues, we are of the view that the activation of external help should not lead to an escalation of systemic risk as seen in the aftermath of the Greek multi-lateral ‘bail-out’. A pre-agreed institutional framework is now in place, and the ‘stress tests’ have provided information on the distribution of risks across the Euro-zone banking sector.

Other than the evolution of the Irish discussions (size of the package and terms), the near term focus will also remain the Iberian peninsula. A workers strike in Portugal this Wednesday will re-kindle the debate on the much needed structural reforms. Spain unveiled a list of these last Friday, but investors remain uncomfortable about the contingent liabilities stemming from the non-listed cooperative banks.

Our opinion is that Portugal remains a possible candidate for external help, should market pressures remain high. But its systemic relevance is much smaller than that of Ireland’s or Greece’s (the largest foreign creditor is Spain). We remain of the view that Spain is in a different debt sustainability position, and the depth of its domestic market should allow it to withstand market pressures.

We continue to recommend holding 30-yr Greek paper, and would look for opportunities to re-establish long positions in intermediate maturity Italian and Spanish government bonds relative to the ‘core’ countries.

Finally, it is worth recalling that the EFSF will not pre-fund, and its funding instruments will have broadly the same profile as the related loans to Ireland. Its issuance program could lead to a marginal cheapening of bonds issued by supra-national institutions such as the European Investment Bank, the German-based KfW and the French CADES. Note, however, that these institutions have borrowing programs of EUR 60-70bn per annum, while the corresponding annual EFSF issuance would be likely quarter of that amount.”

European Union Proposes $928 Billion Crisis Aversion Plan…It’s About Time!

Sunday, May 9th, 2010

After months of avoiding the debt refinancing troubles of Greece, the European Union came together this weekend in a crisis summit to address the falling Euro and credit malaise in the EU.  Describing short investors as a “wolf pack” plaguing the continent, ministers vowed to counter financial markets from causing the Greek debt crisis from spreading.  The plan offers $805 billion (600 billion) to the continent (440 billion euros from EU, 100 billion from IMF, 60 billion Euro stabilization fund) for crisis measures.  This comes after the IMF approved a 30 billion Euro bailout for Greece today.

If the IMF commits 220 billion Euros, the plan could reach $928 billion!

Why 600 billion Euros at the outset?  European economists predict that if Ireland, Portugal, and Spain eventually come to require bailouts similar to Greece’s, the total cost could be some 500 billion euros.

Let’s avoid another Lehman Brothers…

Greece

According to Reuters, “European Union finance ministers on Sunday promised to counter the “wolfpack” of the financial markets as they sought agreement on a 600 billion euro ($805 billion) plan to keep Greece’s debt crisis from spreading.

The compromise measure under discussion included loan guarantees by euro zone countries worth 440 billion euros, a 60 billion euro stabilization fund and a 100 billion euro top-up of International Monetary Fund loans, EU sources said.

Financial markets have been punishing heavily indebted euro zone members, threatening to plunge them into Greece’s plight. The safety net being assembled was meant to protect other countries with bloated budgets, such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland.

Jitters over euro zone finances have set global markets on edge, and provided a backdrop for a nearly 1,000-point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average on Thursday, whose trigger remains a mystery.

Hopes the EU package would successfully tackle the crisis helped lift the euro, which gained almost 2 percent against the U.S. dollar and 3 percent on the yen in early Asia trade. U.S. stock futures also surged at the start of trade on Sunday.

Moving swiftly to bolster Greece and instill some confidence in shaky markets, the IMF approved a 30 billion euro rescue loan as part of a broader combined EU-IMF bailout for the country totaling 110 billion euros. The IMF said 5.5 billion euros from the three-year loan would be disbursed immediately.

To secure the funds, Greece has committed to budget-cutting measures so sharp that they have already caused violent protests.

“Today’s strong action by the IMF to support Greece will contribute to the broad international effort underway to help bring stability to the euro area and secure recovery in the global economy,” IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said in a statement.

‘WOLFPACK BEHAVIORS’

But whether the coordinated international actions would settle global markets, which have been roiled in recent days, remained to be seen. Policymakers around the globe have become worried about the knock-on effects should the crisis spread.

“We now see … wolfpack behaviors, and if we will not stop these packs, even if it is self-inflicted weakness, they will tear the weaker countries apart,” Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg told reporters in Brussels as he arrived for the EU meeting.

Britain’s finance minister Alistair Darling stressed the need to stabilize markets, while ministers from France, Spain, Finland and other euro zone states vowed to defend their shared currency.

U.S. President Barack Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke by phone earlier on Sunday about the importance of EU members acting to build confidence in markets.

Economists estimate that if Portugal, Ireland and Spain — three other heavily indebted euro zone countries — eventually come to require bailouts similar to Greece’s, the total cost could be some 500 billion euros.

As details of the financial barriers that the EU was putting up to ward off speculators against Greece and other debt-laden countries became public, G20 finance officials held a teleconference to discuss the crisis.

Last week, fears that a euro zone debt crisis could rock banks and the global economy like the September 2008 collapse of U.S. bank Lehman Brothers swept through markets, pushing global stocks to near a three-month low. It was unclear whether the EU crisis package would stem the tide.

“All in all this is good news, but it is unlikely in itself to calm markets; it’s all too ‘slow-burner’ stuff,” said Erik Nielsen, chief European economist at Goldman Sachs. He said he expected the European Central Bank would soon need to take some type of emergency action.

EU sources said ECB governors met to discuss the crisis, but no details were available.

MARKET TURMOIL

The 16 nations that use the single currency have been criticized for contributing to market uncertainty by responding too slowly to the crisis in Greece.

An IMF board source told Reuters that some board members had shared those concerns and raised worries that the crisis could spread to other euro zone countries.

A euro zone summit last week asked for a European stabilization mechanism.

Some economists said the move was welcome, but that it would cure the symptoms, rather than the disease.

“By putting in place additional safeguards for the euro area financial system, governments finally appear to be rising to the challenge of the sovereign debt crisis,” Morgan Stanley said in a research note to clients.

“But, like the measures taken before — for the benefit of Greece — a stabilization fund is just buying time for distressed borrowers,” it said.”

Eurozone Credit Risk, Defined

Friday, March 5th, 2010

Great description of Eurozone Credit Risk

Eurozone Sovereign Risk (CA Research)